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Résumé
Cet article analyse les ﬂuctuations et l’allocation du crédit en présence de banques hété-
rogènes dans leur capacité à gérer le risque de contrepartie pour leurs crédits aux entreprises :
une distribution du crédit moins pro-cyclique n’assure pas une allocation eﬃcace du crédit.
Le mécanisme analysé est double. (a) La rente dont bénéﬁcie la banque la plus eﬃcace mo-
diﬁe les incitations à l’eﬀort des entrepreneurs. (b) Les banques qui n’assurent pas de suivi
de l’entrepreneur ont un volume de prêts agrégé moins sensible aux chocs de productivité.
En conséquence : (i) la présence d’un système bancaire hétérogène décroit la productivité
moyenne des entreprises car cela augmente la sélection adverse par les entrepreneurs et fa-
vorise l’extraction de rentes par les banques ; (ii) une banque ayant un volume de prêts
moins cyclique signale une moindre eﬃcacité de ses capacités de gestion du risque ; (iii) une
distribution du crédit moins cyclique sur le plan agrégé peut ne pas être désirable si elle est
associée à une distorsion des incitations et de l’allocation du crédit résultant d’un système
bancaire hétérogène.
Mots clés : hétérogénéité bancaire, hazard moral, selection adverse, segmentation de marché
endogène, allocation du crédit, cycle du crédit.
Codes JEL : G21, E30.
Abstract
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to connect the heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency with lending
ﬂuctuations and allocation eﬃciency : there is a trade-oﬀ between the two in the presence of
heterogeneity in bank monitoring eﬃciency. The mechanism at hand is twofold. (a) First the
rent extracted by the most eﬃcient bank distorts incentives of entrepreneurs to undertake
eﬀorts. (b) Second banks specialising on contracts that do not include monitoring feature
less cyclical ﬂuctuations of aggregate lending. This has clear implications: (i) the pres-
ence of banking heterogeneity decreases ﬁrms’ average productivity as it increases adverse
selection by entrepreneurs as well as favours rent extractions by banks; (ii) an individual
bank featuring a lower cyclicality signals a lower eﬃciency in its monitoring abilities; (iii) a
heterogeneous banking system featuring a lower cyclicality of aggregate lending might not
be desirable as it may come along with allocative and incentives distortions.
Keywords : banking heterogeneity, moral hazard, adverse selection, endogenous market seg-
mentation, allocation eﬃciency, lending cycle.
JEL Classification : G21, E30.
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Executive summary
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to connect heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency with lending ﬂuctu-
ations and allocative eﬃciency, and I show that there is a trade-oﬀ between the two when banks
are heterogeneous. More precisely I introduce a heterogeneous wedge in the monitoring cost of
banks and look at the consequences for entrepreneurs’ eﬀort choice, individual and aggregate
credit allocation as well as the evolution of productivity in equilibrium. This type of hetero-
geneity across banks is akin to a negative externality because banks’ monitoring decisions spill
over all market segments –including those that do not necessarily require monitoring– through
entrepreneurs’ adverse selection of banks’ loan contracts. Nevertheless both eﬃcient and less
eﬃcient banks still exist in equilibrium, as less eﬃcient banks, if they cannot be competitive
when distinguishing high from medium eﬀort-making entrepreneurs, still have a competitive
technology to distinguish medium eﬀort-making entrepreneurs from non-productive projects.
Thus, heterogeneity in bank lending ﬂuctuations reﬂects the heterogeneity on the asset
side with projects of variable proﬁtability; in other words, heterogeneity in bank monitoring
eﬃciency provides incentives for banks to specialise in lending to speciﬁc entrepreneurs. The
diﬀerences in monitoring costs generate an endogenous market segmentation which allows the
most eﬃcient bank to extract a rent on a niche. On the one hand, this rent distorts credit
allocation and incentives : some entrepreneurs ﬁnd themselves better oﬀ reducing the intensity
of their eﬀort and thus choose loan contracts outside of the niche that do not include monitoring.
On the other hand, banks that do not monitor entrepreneurs feature less cyclical ﬂuctuations of
aggregate lending: more entrepreneurs choose these less eﬃcient banks in bad times as they do
not want to make eﬀorts (extensive margin), and these banks reduce less the loan size oﬀered to
entrepreneurs as lower eﬀort is relatively less detrimental to incentives in bad times (intensive
margin). Overall, increased banking heterogeneity reduces the ﬂuctuations of the economy as
increased rent extraction reduces the share and the size of the procyclical loan contracts granted
to eﬀort-making entrepreneurs.
This has clear implications:
1. First, when one observes some banks featuring a lower cyclicality of their aggregate lend-
ing, it may not be desirable to favour their development to obtain less cyclicality as it
may signal a lower eﬃciency in their monitoring abilities.
2. Second, if some countries seemed to have been more resilient to the early phases of the
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crisis by not cutting aggregate lending so much which resulted in smaller variations of
output, it may be at the cost of a very heterogeneous banking sector associated with
allocation ineﬃciencies.
3. Third, overall banking eﬃciency is not enough to ensure allocation eﬃciency, so that a
more granular approach is required to make a sound assessment of a banking sector’s
eﬃciency, as more banking heterogeneity is detrimental to aggregate productivity.
4. Fourth, increasing banking concentration, i.e. giving them more market power on the main
segment of the market, can reduce the rent extraction in the niche, but is detrimental to
overall resources allocation.
5. Last, reforms implementing new regulations which would have an impact on monitoring
or screening incentives (such as capital or liquidity regulation) should also be careful
not to increase banking heterogeneity that would create possibilities of rent extractions
and distort the adverse selection process by borrowers and as a result dampen lending
ﬂuctuations at the cost of increased allocation ineﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
Structural reforms of the banking sector focus on deﬁning the scope of allowed activities,
both to increase the resilience and the stability of the banking system. But this approach does
not tackle the issue of the heterogeneity of the banking sector within its boundaries. Before
pushing forward reforms aiming at fostering the development of activities deemed as more stable,
one should ﬁrst investigate the source of their apparent stability and the associated consequence
for allocation eﬃciency.
Indeed, lending ﬂuctuations and productivity levels may not go hand in hand. The ﬁnance
and growth literature mostly backs the idea that deeper ﬁnancial markets (Levine, 2005; Ra-
jan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000) and a larger ﬁnancial sector (King and Levine, 1993;
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Hartmann et al., 2007) would have a positive impact on capital
allocation eﬃciency and growth. However, since the Great Recession, it becomes more widely
accepted that there is a tradeoﬀ with ﬁnancial stability, whereby a more developed ﬁnancial
sector increases volatility (Kose et al., 2003; Levchenko et al., 2009), with crises usually being
preceded by rapid out-of-trend growth in ﬁnancial aggregates (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;
Alessi and Detken, 2009).
Some new evidences suggest that cross-sectional diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial sector, especially
banking heterogeneity, did inﬂuence the cyclical behaviour of the economy. Heterogeneity in
bank eﬃciency seemed to help countries weather the ﬁrst part of the crisis, that is to say the
presence of a less eﬃcient banking system limited the reduction in output growth (Giannone
et al., 2011). Moreover, some speciﬁc banking activities such as investment banking are known
to be more volatile than standard commercial banking (Adrian and Shin, 2010); likewise, banks
with speciﬁc ownership characteristics feature diﬀerent lending patterns, with governmental
owned banks (Duprey, 2012; Bertay et al., 2012) or banks active only on a local segment of the
market (Micco and Panizza, 2006) having a lending policy less responsive to macroeconomic
shocks. So banking heterogeneity seems to be a source of ﬂuctuations, and lending ﬂuctuations
across banks is itself heterogeneous. But this additional layer of (heterogeneous) cyclicality may
not coincide with credit allocation eﬃciency by channelling too much funds either to excessively
risky investments or to mismanaged ﬁrms not properly incentivised to behave well.
In this paper, I investigate the extent to which heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency matters
for lending ﬂuctuations at the aggregate and across banks, as well as the implied reallocation
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of credit in the economy and the consequence for overall productivity; I show that increasing
banking heterogeneity creates a trade-oﬀ between dampening the sensitivity of lending to pro-
ductivity shocks and reaching an allocation of credit ensuring productive eﬃciency. To that
extent, I develop a framework based on contract theory with three main ingredients, namely
moral hazard, adverse selection and rent extraction, in order to study variations of banking het-
erogeneity on both the cross-sectional and time dimension of credit allocation. The wedge comes
from the introduction of heterogeneity in monitoring abilities which thus creates a monitoring
eﬃciency externality diﬀerent across banks: introducing a wedge in monitoring eﬃciencies on
the market that requires monitoring may spill over to markets which do not require monitoring,
and thus modify bank loan contracts even when monitoring is not required. Note that the model
reproduces the realistic feature of a countercyclical markup on the cost of loans, positive proﬁts
for banks due to rent extraction and limited competition, as well as procyclical individual loan
contracts.
The model includes heterogeneity along three dimensions. First I consider several ﬁnancial
intermediaries (from the duopoly to the n-bank case) whose only diﬀerence is their position in
the distribution of monitoring cost. Second I depart from the standard ﬁnance literature by
considering more than one positive NVP project, so that I have two layers of moral hazard,
corresponding respectively to the choice of eﬀort intensity which is simpliﬁed to be binary,
and the choice of shirking or not which is represented by a negative NPV project with private
beneﬁts. This heterogeneity in NPV’s projects allows to create a phenomenon of niche; else,
with a single positive NPV project, I would fall back in the traditional Darwinian process where
the less eﬃcient banking institutions never enter the market. Third I have a continuum of
entrepreneurs with diﬀerent eﬀort abilities which introduces adverse selection. It makes sure
that some entrepreneurs will always be less keen to pay the private eﬀort cost so that they would
prefer to decrease their eﬀort intensities by not choosing the largest positive NVP project; they
can do so by not revealing their type to the banks and avoiding monitoring.
The story goes as follows. Banks with larger monitoring costs are de facto less eﬃcient
than their counterparts but do not necessarily disappear in equilibrium. This wedge creates
an endogenous market segmentation ; as the eﬃcient bank has a comparative advantage in
monitoring entrepreneurs in order to reduce moral hazard, competition will force less eﬃcient
competitors out of this market segment. It then allows the eﬃcient bank to extract a rent over
the fair interest repayment. As a result only entrepreneurs with a suﬃciently small cost of eﬀort
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relative to the gains from a larger probability of success will self-select this contract inducing
the maximum amount of eﬀort. In other word, the most eﬃcient bank ﬁnds itself in a niche
from which it can extract a rent on high productivity entrepreneurs.
The remaining active ﬁrms, which would undertake the minimal amount of eﬀort, will natu-
rally turn to the banking sector that does not monitor actively entrepreneurs. If banks’ market
power is positive and bank entry has a signiﬁcant impact on competition, that is to say the
banking sector is not fully competitive, then the less eﬃcient banks will be the only ones active
on the segment of the market for low-eﬀort entrepreneurs. Indeed the following rent seeking and
adverse selection argument applies : the most eﬃcient bank would be better oﬀ extracting the
largest rent it can on eﬀort-making entrepreneurs, so it should lock in its customers by making
sure other segments of the market are not too attractive for them. The eﬃcient bank can do so
by preventing itself from entering other markets; else it would increase banking competition in
other market segments which would result in more attractive contracts oﬀered to entrepreneurs
outside the niche; this would ultimately provide an incentive for entrepreneurs previously in the
niche and willing to make the highest level of eﬀort to choose now the minimum required level
of eﬀort, on which only a smaller or no rent can be extracted.
Thus I obtain a separating equilibrium, with the tail (least able) entrepreneurs choosing to
undertake the minimum required level of eﬀort and self-selecting the contracts designed by less
eﬃcient banks, while entrepreneurs with good eﬀort abilities choose to make more eﬀort and thus
prefer to self-select banking contracts oﬀered by the most eﬃcient bank that allow them to reveal
their type truthfully upon monitoring 1. Henceforth, the heterogeneity in lending ﬂuctuations
reﬂects the heterogeneity in the productive sector, that is to say the composition of the asset
side 2; then heterogeneity in monitoring eﬃciency provides incentives for banks to specialise in
lending to speciﬁc entrepreneurs. Note that both eﬃcient and less eﬃcient banks still exist in
equilibrium, as less eﬃcient banks, if they cannot be competitive when distinguishing high from
medium eﬀort-making entrepreneurs, still have a competitive technology to distinguish medium
eﬀort-making from negative NPV projects associated with private beneﬁts to entrepreneurs,
hence the need to have a richer NPV project structure.
The source of fluctuation in this model is threefold. First I have the standard source of
1. In other words, there is a sort of complementarity between effort provided by entrepreneurs and monitoring
undertaken by the banker, i.e. both need to get involved to make sure the high yield project is undertaken. This
is especially true for small and medium size firms, and could be understood as a sort of one period lending
relationship.
2. I abstract from heterogeneity on the liability side.
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cyclicality highlighted in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) which is that the moral hazard itself is
countercyclical, hence the beneﬁt of deviating decreases when the economy expands. So whether
or not I have banking heterogeneity, I will still obtain procyclical variations in the model.
Second the structure of the contract leads to heterogeneity in lending ﬂuctuations. On the
one hand, due to softer moral hazard considerations for entrepreneurs making less eﬀort, indi-
vidual loan amounts are less responsive to productivity shocks for less eﬃcient bank contracts
(intensive margin); while on the other hand, in periods of recession, adverse selection worsens so
that more entrepreneurs decide to switch to the minimum eﬀort level allowed, i.e. from eﬃcient
to less eﬃcient bank loan contracts (extensive margin). Henceforth, in case of productivity
shock, both the size of the loan and the number of customers selecting eﬃcient bank contracts
decrease, while for less eﬃcient banks the size of the loan decreases less than for eﬃcient bank
contracts and the pool of entrepreneurs at the minimum eﬀort level self-selecting less eﬃcient
bank contracts increases. So at the aggregate level, eﬃcient bank lending is more responsive to
productivity shocks –more procyclical– than bank lending by less eﬃcient banks.
Third, the speciﬁc source of ﬂuctuation added here is due to the bank heterogeneity in
monitoring abilities which leads to adverse selection: endogenous decisions by competing banks
to monitor or not, when monitoring abilities are known but heterogeneous across banks, create a
dampening eﬀect steaming from market segmentation. The more heterogeneity there is between
bank monitoring technology, i.e. the less eﬃcient the technology for some banks, the lower the
aggregate cyclicality compared to the optimum. It can be understood as the additional rent
extraction by the most eﬃcient bank reduces the number of eﬀort-making entrepreneurs, that is
to say it reduces the share of the most pro-cyclical ﬁnancial institution, and overall sensitivity
to productivity changes is reduced.
Then the allocative distortion associated with banking heterogeneity is as follows. Because
of the endogeneous switching decisions between several positive NPV projects, the productivity
shock –homogeneous for all projects– can result into a heterogeneous reaction of bank loan
contracts and modify the distribution of eﬀort choices, creating a composition eﬀect; thus
the common productivity shock may not necessarily map one to one into aggregate observed
productivity. The presence of heterogeneity in bank monitoring eﬃciency decreases average
productivity as it increases adverse selection by entrepreneurs (extensive margin) as well as
favours rent extractions by banks (intensive margin). Henceforth, the reallocation of loans
towards entrepreneurs making less eﬀort and the incentives distortions induced by the creation
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of a niche lead to an unambiguous negative impact on output levels, which is here the only
possible metric to analyse allocation eﬃciency. Last, if the market power of the less eﬃcient
banks was to increase, it could partly get the ﬂuctuations and incentives right by preventing
switches due to rent extraction diﬀerential across market segments, but it would take further
resources away from the most able entrepreneurs willing to make eﬀort.
Five main policy implications are straightforward from the model. First, when one observes
some banks featuring a lower cyclicality of their aggregate lending, it may not be desirable to
favour their development to obtain less cyclicality as it may signal a lower eﬃciency in their
monitoring abilities. Second, if some countries seemed to have been more resilient to the early
phases of the crisis by not cutting aggregate lending so much which resulted in smaller varia-
tions of output, it may be at the cost of a very heterogeneous banking sector associated with
allocation ineﬃciencies. Third, overall banking eﬃciency is not enough to ensure allocation
eﬃciency, so that a more granular approach is required to make a sound assessment of a bank-
ing sector’s eﬃciency, as more banking heterogeneity is detrimental to aggregate productivity.
Fourth, increasing banking concentration, i.e. giving them more market power on the main
segment of the market, can reduce the rent extraction in the niche, but is detrimental to overall
resources allocation. Last, reforms implementing new regulations which would have an impact
on monitoring or screening incentives (such as capital or liquidity regulation) should also be
careful not to increase banking heterogeneity that would create possibilities of rent extractions
or induce adverse selection and as a result decrease lending ﬂuctuations at the cost of larger
allocation ineﬃciencies.
The next section provides the main stylized facts on banking heterogeneity and banking
eﬃciency. Section 3 presents the heterogeneous banking model with moral hazard, adverse se-
lection and rent seeking. First I derive the equilibrium for two benchmarks, the homogeneous
banking case (section 4) and the social equilibrium (section 5). Then I study in section 6 the
equilibrium with two heterogeneous banks before extending it in section 7 by considering several
banks. Last, section 8 emphasizes the main sources of distortion associated with banking het-
erogeneity, both in terms of allocation and ﬂuctuation. Section 9 provides numerical simulations
and section 10 concludes.
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2 Stylized facts
By banking heterogeneity, I mean heterogeneity in monitoring eﬃciency via diﬀerences in
bank abilities to manage high yield loans or diﬀerent costs of doing so. So as a proxy for cost
eﬃciency in loan management, I use the variable Overhead costs from the bank speciﬁc database
Bankscope 3 over unconsolidated balance sheet statements from 1995 to 2010, thus including
27540 banks in 178 countries. Then to be able to focus on the heterogeneity in banking eﬃciency,
I use the standard deviation 4 of the Overhead over Asset ratio (in constant 2005 USD) within
each country for each year; thus I actually plot 662 country year observations. A standard
deviation close to zero would mean that the banking sector is more homogeneous in its cost
eﬃciency. Instead of the raw correlation, the displayed coeﬃcient for the slope of the regression
line on each graph includes country and year ﬁxed eﬀect to remove unnecessary noise from the
large panel and thus strenghten the stylised facts.
The novel set of stylised facts outlined here, which is the focus of the modelling, is the
following:
1. bank lending decision are heterogeneous across banks. Thus heterogeneous bank-
ing eﬃciency maps into heterogeneous lending decisions, which is proxied by larger stan-
dard deviation of the ratio of aggregate bank lending over total assets (see graph 1);
2. heterogeneous banking efficiency is associated with allocation inefficiencies. At
the bank level, a more heterogeneous banking sector maps into lower lending aggregated
(see graph 2). At the country level, a more heterogeneous banking sector is possibly
detrimental to productivity : productivity is proxied by the output gap which results
from an H-P ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 6.5 on USD 2005 constant GDP taken from
the World Bank statistics (see graph 3). Thus with banking heterogeneity being associ-
ated with lower lending volumes and lower production intensities, a more heterogeneous
banking tend to be also associated with lower GDP growth (see graph 4).
3. heterogeneous banking efficiency is associated with lower lending fluctuations.
At the bank level, it has been outlined by Duprey (2012) and Bertay et al. (2012) in the
speciﬁc case of public banks which are largely accepted to be detrimental to long term
macroeconomic variables since the seminal paper by La Porta et al. (2002). Likewise
3. For a more precise description of the database, see Duprey and Lé (2012).
4. I exclude standard deviation of the ratio above 100 which can be considered as outliers. Also, I drop growth
rates of assets above 100% which likely reflects mergers and acquisitions.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous banking efficiency maps into heterogeneous lending volatilities
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national banks feature lower lending ﬂuctuations than foreign owned banks that usually
implement better banking practices (Micco and Panizza, 2006). At the country level, the
work by Giannone et al. (2011) suggests that a less eﬃcient banking sector was associated
with a lower output drop in the early phase of the Great Recession.
3 Description of the model
The model I present here follows the lines of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) (thereafter HT)
although it departs from the original paper on several important points. First the incentive
structure is expressed in the same way as Reichlin (2004). Then I focus on a distribution of eﬀort
cost –i.e. eﬀort abilities– among the entrepreneurs rather than a distribution of collateral, in
order to emphasize how the eﬃciency of the banking sector translates into productive eﬃciency 5.
But the main deviation from the original HT paper is that I allow for two projects, with two
eﬀort intensities, to have a positive –but diﬀerent– net present value.
5. Note that with a variable investment scale, which is the case here, firms with different levels of assets
would use the same optimal policy scaled by their asset; hence assuming an identical level of collateral across all
entrepreneurs is not restrictive here and only makes the exposition easier.
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Figure 2: Heterogeneous banking efficiency maps into lower bank lending
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Figure 3: Heterogeneous banking efficiency maps into lower productivity
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous banking efficiency maps into lower GDP growth
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3.1 The heterogeneous entrepreneurship sector
A ﬁrm, set up by an entrepreneur, can only have recourse to a single ﬁnancial intermediary
to get a ﬁnancing ; the type of ﬁrms I focus on here is small and medium sized ﬁrms that cannot
issue debt directly on the stock markets.
Entrepreneurs can undertake three types of project, High, Medium or Low, which are as-
sociated with a high, medium or low probability of success, respectively pH , pM and pL, with
pH > pM > pL > 0. Denote ∆H = pH − pM and ∆M = pM − pL. For a given productivity
level α and interest rate r, both H and M projects have a positive NPV, while project L has a
negative NPV.
Assumption 1. αpH > αpM > r > αpL
Because of the presence of the negative NPV project, I have the classical source of moral haz-
ard which forces banks to provide an adequate loans contract in order to prevent entrepreneurs
from diverting part of the resources supposed to be invested in the ﬁrm in order to reap a
private beneﬁt b.
Then the simultaneous existence of two positive NPV projects creates an other source of
moral hazard, which is the natural counterpart of having an heterogeneous entrepreneurship
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sector. I consider a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by their eﬀort cost e per unit of capital
invested in the ﬁrm; for simplicity the density function f(e) is assumed to follow a uniform
distribution e→ U(
[
emin; emax
]
). Thereafter in the paper, I use e as the cost of eﬀort of some
entrepreneur picked in the previous distribution. Thus entrepreneurs face the following moral
hazard problem: if they choose to undertake a high yield project H, they will have to bear a
pecuniary cost of eﬀort e if induced by bank monitoring, or el = e − l < e if the entrepreneur
decides to provide eﬀorts without being scrutinized by the monitor. However, if they choose
to undertake a medium yield project M, the cost of eﬀort will be γe, i.e. proportionally less
than the entrepreneurs’ type if the maximum eﬀort was provided; for simplicity, I set γ = 0 as
it allows to derive closed formed solutions. Eﬀort cost depending on the project undertaken is
given by:
Ej =


e, for j=H, then proba of success pH
0, for j=M, then proba of success pM
−b, for j=L, then proba of success pL
Then entrepreneurs will default with a positive probability 1− pj , j ∈ {H,M,L}, and I as-
sume that everything is lost in case of default. Henceforth the capital needed by an entrepreneur
to run his ﬁrm has to be borrowed at a higher cost than the market risk-free interest rate. En-
trepreneurs will ﬁrst invest their own wealth A, which is homogeneous across all of them, and
borrow B, which will depend on entrepreneurs’ type, to run a project of size k = A+B. Note
that, by deﬁnition, for the same positive NPV project and a linear production function, an
entrepreneur will seek to contract with the bank oﬀering the largest loan.
The proﬁt of an entrepreneur is expressed as follows:
πj = pj(y
i −RiBi)− Ejk
i (1)
with ki = Bi + A, i ∈ {h, l} the type of bank and j ∈ {H,M,L} the type of project
undertaken, with high or low eﬀort. y = αki is a constant return to scale production function
with productivity parameter α; the price of the output is normalized to 1.
Due to the presence of ﬁxed costs EjA and constant returns pjαA, if, on average, the
entrepreneur can be better oﬀ making eﬀort and behaving, the marginal gain of making eﬀort
(behaving) is lower than shirking (diverting funds). Nevertheless, the project is not separable:
if the entrepreneur decides to shirk, it shirks for the whole project, likewise if he behaves or not.
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Assumption 2. e > ∆H(α−R
i)
Assumption 3. b > ∆M (α−R
i)
Note that only the H-project can sustain eﬀort αpH − e > r, while one would never choose
to make eﬀort if the probability of success was to remain medium, that is to say αpM − e < r.
Nevertheless, from a social point of view, project H would be preferred as its NPV adjusted for
the pecuniary cost of eﬀort is higher αpH − e − c > αpM , that is to say the marginal product
of eﬀort is larger than the marginal product of shirking. Likewise, it is always socially optimal
to avoid the negative NPV project, since the marginal product of behaving is assumed larger
than the marginal product of diverting funds pM (α− r) > pL(α− r) + b.
Assumption 4. ∆M (α− r) > b
3.2 The heterogeneous banking sector
I introduce some heterogeneity in the banking sector, in the form of a diﬀerent cost structure.
I consider two competing banks with diﬀerent monitoring cost, cl for the bank featuring a higher
monitoring ability and low cost of doing so, and ch for the bank featuring a lower monitoring
ability and a high associated cost, that is to say ch = (1 + φ)cl with φ > 0 being the degree of
bank heterogeneity in monitoring abilities. The Bertrand duopoly approach is only necessary in
order to depart from the fully competitive case and get positive proﬁts for banks in equilibrium.
Each competing ﬁnancial institution will design two loan contracts, respectively Ch(Rh, Bh)
and C l(Rl, Bl), for a given level of personal contribution A. The type of the entrepreneur is
not observed at the contract design stage, but the bank knows that some entrepreneurs will
have to be compensated for their eﬀort and factors that in to design a contract from which
the entrepreneur will not deviate. Henceforth, each bank will design two types of contracts for
entrepreneurs making eﬀort (H project) and those making less eﬀort or shirking but who do not
misbehave (M project). In addition, when designing its set of contracts, each bank will take
into account the fact that entrepreneurs will compare the diﬀerent loan contracts, so that banks
engage in ex-ante contract competition with each other before ﬁnalising their contracts. This
seems realistic as banks usually ﬁx their credit standard every month by taking into account
both their ﬁnancing ability as well as the situation of competitors, and on a day-to-day basis
they only adjust generic contracts to each borrower, depending on the assessment of the type
of the borrower.
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To ﬁnance their loans, banks have to levy funds on the capital markets at the risk-free
interest rate r; their role is thus to pool idiosyncratic risks associated with individual loans in
order to oﬀer a constant return on savings that does not depend on the probability of success
of the ﬁrms. Thus a bank will oﬀer a loan contract that covers both the cost of ﬁnancing r (or
opportunity cost of providing a loan), and the monitoring cost c if it decides to monitor.
Πi = pjR
iBi − ciki − rBi (2)
with i ∈ {h, l}. So it has to be that the bank ﬁnds it proﬁtable to make at least H-type
contracts, that is to say for a marginal unit of loan I have pHR
i > ci + r. Moreover, I consider
only the meaningful case where the monitoring cost is lower than the cost of ﬁnancing a loan
ci < r.
Assumption 5. pHR
i > ci + r with r > ci
Note that I abstract from diﬀerences on the liability side between banks having diﬀerent
cost structures on the asset side, in order to isolate the eﬀect of bank monitoring heterogeneity
both on credit allocation and credit ﬂuctuations, and show that despite the fact that one type of
bank is clearly dominated –higher monitoring costs are not compensated for instance by easier
access to capital markets–, it may have non trivial implications in equilibrium in a model with
entrepreneurs heterogeneity.
3.3 Information
Ex-ante, the banks do not know the speciﬁc characteristics of the entrepreneurs –neither e
nor b– but know each distribution among the pool of entrepreneurs. Ex-post, after the contracts
have been designed by the banks, for each entrepreneur who enters a bank, it immediately reveals
its private beneﬁt from shirking and diverting funds b, and, upon monitoring by the bank, its
eﬀort cost is revealed.
Hence the social beneﬁt in having ﬁnancial intermediaries lies in their ability to perfectly
screen out bad projects with negative NPV. If one was to allow ﬁnancing by outside experts,
they would not be able to monitor and discriminate depending on the cost of eﬀort, hence
leading to a pooled equilibrium where outside ﬁnanciers would treat everyone like the worst
agent. This case is left as an extension.
16
Note that contract commitment is not strictly speaking necessary in equilibrium as the
incentives are such that banks would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate.
The time-line of the model is displayed in ﬁgure 5.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is defined by a set of two active contracts
ζ =
{
C∗iEC |e ≤ e¯, C
∗i′
non−EC |e > e¯
}
with i, i′ ∈ {h, l}, one on each segment of the market, monitored (effort compatible for high yield
projects) or not (non-effort inducing for medium yield projects), denoted respectively {EC, non−
EC}; market segmentation is given by the endogenous effort cost threshold e¯. The set of active
contracts is chosen by entrepreneurs among a set of four contracts ξ such that, for high (medium)
yield project H (M):
{
C∗iEC |e ≤ e¯
}
= argmax{B≥0,R>0} {πH |ξ}{
C∗i
′
non−EC |e > e¯
}
= argmax{B≥0,R>0} {πM |ξ}
with
ξ = {ChEC , C
l
EC , C
h
non−EC , C
l
non−EC}
where each contract proposed by an institution i ∈ {h, l} on a segment j ∈ {EC, non− EC} is
defined by the pair Cij(B
i
j , R
i
j |α, r,A, e, c
i, C−ij ). B
i
j stands for the loan size, R
i
j for the interest
rate offered, α for the productivity, r for the market interest rate, A for the level of personal
contribution, e for the type of the entrepreneur, ci for the monitoring cost and C−ij for the
banking contract designed by the competitor.
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Figure 5: Time-line of the decision process
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4 Equilibrium without bank heterogeneity
The fully competitive equilibrium, which would arise for instance by assuming a continuum
of banks of each type h and l, is in fact equivalent to the Bertrand duopoly case without bank
heterogeneity (φ = 0), that is to say 2 or more completely identical banks 6 competing to design
the most attractive loan contracts. In this benchmark case, all rents are transferred to the
entrepreneurs and banks make zero proﬁts, that is to say there is no positive markup in the
banking industry.
Since there exists two types of projects which can be undertaken, High (H) or Medium (M)
yield, the setting of the model de facto implies that there will be a market segmentation with
some entrepreneurs choosing one project or the other. Thus banks need to design one contract
supporting each project by making sure the entrepreneur will not deviate from it.
4.1 Contract design stage : High yield compatible
The contract supporting the High yield project has to be such that the Eﬀort Compatibility
(EC) constraint (3), which ensures the largest positive NPV project is undertaken by the en-
trepreneur, and the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint (4), which ensures the entrepreneur
does not pick the negative NPV project, are satisﬁed. So each bank has to make sure that the
following holds:
pH(αk −RB)− ek ≥ pM (αk −RB) (3)
pH(αk −RB)− ek ≥ pL(αk −RB) + bk (4)
But then the bank has an incentive to provide an H-type contract only if it is more proﬁtable
to learn the type of the entrepreneur and monitor his eﬀort. As a consequence the bank incurs
a cost c, such that its Monitoring Constraint (MC) and Participation Constraint (PC) are
respectively given by:
pHRB − ck ≥ pMRB (5)
pHRB − ck ≥ rB (6)
Equation (6) states that the expected return from oﬀering an H-type contract has to be greater
6. Thus the subscript {h, l} is dropped for the homogeneous case.
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or equal to the opportunity cost of lending on the market.
The fully competitive H-type contract is obtained as follows; the equilibrium loan size B∗ is
obtained from equations (3) and (4) which can be rearranged as follows:
B ≤
α− e/∆H
e/∆H +R− α
A ≡ BEC (7)
B ≤
α− b−epH−pL
b−e
pH−pL
+R− α
A ≡ BIC (8)
Equations (7) and (8) give the maximum loan amount such that entrepreneurs have respectively
no incentives to make less eﬀort and no incentives to divert part of the resources. For the problem
of the entrepreneur to make sense, it has to be that we have BEC < BIC , that is to say that
when the entrepreneur is better oﬀ making the maximal eﬀorts, he does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
divert funds, while not diverting funds may not necessarily imply the maximal eﬀort-making.
So I focus on the case where the following restriction holds.
Assumption 6. e > b ∆H2pH−pM−pL
Since the entrepreneur’s proﬁt is increasing in k, he will seek for the contract that allows
for the maximum leverage, so in order to remain competitive, each bank will have to oﬀer the
upper bound on borrowing:
BcH = BEC (9)
Then the equilibrium interest rate RcH is obtained from equation (6) which must hold as
an equality due to perfect competition and the associated zero proﬁts condition obtained from
equating equation (2) to zero. Rearranging and plugging in the value of BcH given in equation
(9), I obtain the following competitive equilibrium interest rate:
RcH =
r
Qc
(10)
where Qc = pH −
c∆H
α∆H−e
can be thought of as the risk premium adjusted for competition. Since
Q < pH , banks oﬀer an interest on loans which comprises a risk premium over the risk free rate
and is also adjusted for the cost of monitoring.
Due to this ex-ante contract competition, the model features countercyclical markup 1Q when
a productivity shock hits. RcH is positive under the condition that c < pH(α−e/∆) which states
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Figure 6: H-type contract indifference curves
that the expected marginal return of an entrepreneur making eﬀort has to be larger than the
marginal cost of monitoring to ensure he does not shirk.
Assumption 7. c < pH(α− e/∆H)
Proposition 1. Without bank heterogeneity or equivalently full competition, all banks offer
the same H-type-inducing contract CcH (R
c
H , B
c
H) which successfully mitigates the two sources of
moral hazard, with:
BcH = BEC
RcH = r/Q
c
under assumptions 1-2 and 5-7.
Figure 6 represents the contract on the sub-segment of the market successfully implementing
the High yield projects. The demand curve of loans by entrepreneurs corresponds to equation
(7), that is to say the maximum leverage allowed for entrepreneurs making the eﬀort. The
equilibrium pair {B;R} lies on this demand curve since entrepreneurs are better oﬀ the larger
the loan size. The intuition for the shape of the iso-proﬁt curves of the bank is as follows:
the bank is indiﬀerent between making a small loan but earning a large interest margin and
making a large loan but only making a small margin on each unit lent. In the absence of bank
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heterogeneity and thus perfect competition, all banks would be as eﬃcient as the others (or be
like the most eﬃcient one, bank l for low cost) and the zero proﬁt equilibrium for the bank
would have been reached in point A1.
4.2 Contract design stage : Medium yield compatible
The contract supporting the Medium type of project is such that the bank is better oﬀ not
knowing the type of the entrepreneur; that is to say it accepts a lower expected probability of
success as it saves on the cost of monitoring necessary to know the entrepreneur’s type. But
then the bank cannot condition loan size on entrepreneurs type, such that they will be better
oﬀ leveraging the maximum they can, which will fail to give them the appropriate incentives to
make eﬀort.
At the design stage, the bank will take into account the fact that the entrepreneur, at the
choice stage, will participate without providing eﬀorts while the entrepreneur is still better oﬀ
not diverting funds away; both conditions, that the EC does not hold while the IC does, are
respectively given by:
pH(αk −RB)− e
lk ≤ pM (αk −RB) (11)
pM (αk −RB) ≥ pL(αk −RB) + bk (12)
From (11), one gets a lower bound BEC < B
∗ above which the entrepreneur is better oﬀ not
making too much eﬀorts. Then a bank i ∈ {h, l} still participates but is better oﬀ not learning
the entrepreneur cost of eﬀort which saves on its own cost; so the MC constraint does not hold
while the PC does, both constraints being respectively given by:
pHRB − ck ≤ pMRB (13)
pMRB ≥ rB (14)
Since the banks face perfect competition and do not diﬀer from each other on this segment
of the market (no monitoring cost is paid), the equilibrium will be symmetric and lie at the
zero proﬁts constraint of the banks. Thus the PC of the bank in (14) will be binding, so that
the interest rate oﬀered for the M-yield supporting contract RcM will just be the risk-free rate
adjusted for the default premium.
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Using the above-mentioned proﬁtability assumptions, the set of constraint (11), (12) and
(13) for an institution i ∈ {h, l} can be expressed as:
B ≥
α− el/∆H
el/∆H +R− α
A ≡ B¯EC (15)
B ≤
α− b/∆M
b/∆M +R− α
A ≡ B¯IC (16)
B ≤
c
∆HR− c
A ≡ B¯MC (17)
Since entrepreneurs are better oﬀ leveraging the most they can, the loan size will be given
by one of the two potential upper bound of equation (16) and (17). Note that equation (17) is
necessarily met provided that (15) holds. Indeed, assume that (13) is not met, so that I have
pHRB − ck ≥ pMRB. But equation (15) implies that the entrepreneur is better oﬀ shirking
so that such level of loans is not eﬀort compatible: even if the bank was to pay the cost to
learn the type e of the entrepreneur, at such loan level, it could not use this information to
implement an eﬀort compatible contract. So the realized probability of success would be lower
at pM ; the incentive constraint of the bank would thus write pMRB − ck ≥ pMRB which is
obviously violated. So the bottom line is that equation (17) cannot be deviated from if (15)
holds; since equation (15) is a lower bound it is necessarily met in equilibrium, so that the loan
size oﬀered by the bank will be given by the incentive compatible equation (16) holding as an
equality.
Again on this segment of the market, I restrict to the meaningful case where B¯IC ≥ B¯EC .
Assumption 8. b ≥ ∆M∆H e
l
Proposition 2. Without bank heterogeneity or equivalently full competition, all banks offer the
same M-type-inducing contract CcM (R
c
M , B
c
M ) which successfully mitigates the traditional source
of moral hazard by avoiding the negative NPV project but fails to mitigate the second source of
moral hazard by not supporting the highest yield project, with:
BcM = B¯IC
RcM = r/pM
under assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 8.
Figure 7 represents the equilibrium contract on the M-yield segment of the market. The
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Figure 7: M-type contract indifference curves
dotted line represents the interest rate such that any bank i breaks even. The feasibility set for
ﬁrms is represented by the area under the curve which maximises entrepreneurs’ proﬁts which
represents equation (16). So the competitive equilibrium is given by point A1, while point A2
is not achievable as the banks would never ﬁnance negative NPV projects.
4.3 Contract choice stage : separating equilibrium
An entrepreneur e will self-select the M-yield project if it is more proﬁtable for him not to
make eﬀorts, that is to say if he is better-oﬀ choosing the contract CcM (R
c
M , B
c
M ), so that :
CcM (R
c
M , B
c
M ) ≻ C
c
H(R
c
H , B
c
H) (18)
πM (R
c
M , B
c
M ) ≥ πH(R
c
H , B
c
H)
pM (α(B
c
M +A)−R
c
MB
c
M ) ≥ pH (α(B
c
H +A)−R
c
HB
c
H)− ek
c
H
The cutoﬀ level of eﬀort e¯c is obtained when the last equation holds with equality; hence the
proposition follows.
Proposition 3. The separating competitive equilibrium in the absence of bank heterogeneity
(φ = 0) is such that:
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– entrepreneurs with a low cost of effort e < e¯c will undertake the H-yield project and choose
contract CcH (R
c
H , B
c
H);
– entrepreneurs with a high cost of effort e > e¯c will undertake the M-yield project and
choose contract CcM (R
c
M , B
c
M ).
5 Social optimum
I now turn to the description of the optimal contracts which would maximise aggregate
surplus. The optimal outcome is to maximise leverage on the H-yield contracts since I have a
larger marginal return of leverage αpH−e−c > αpM ; so entrepreneurs with cost of eﬀort below
α∆H − c ≡ e¯
o should be incentivised to choose the H-type projects. So the optimal benchmark
is given by equilibrium contract A1 on graph 6 and around A3 on graph 7 in order to make sure
the entrepreneurs who can make eﬀort are not attracted on the M-yield segment of the market.
Thus the optimum fully takes into account the disincentive eﬀect induced by the possibility of
switching between diﬀerent market segments inherent to a model with more than one positive
NPV project; the externality induced by adverse selection by entrepreneurs across markets is
internalized.
Proposition 4. The social optimum which fully internalises the effect of adverse selection in
a segmented market is given by the pair of contracts:
– entrepreneurs with a low cost of effort e < e¯o will undertake the H-yield project and choose
contract CoH (R
o
H = R
c
H , B
o
H = B
c
H);
– entrepreneurs with a high cost of effort e > e¯o will undertake the M-yield project and
choose contract CoM (R
o
M > R
c
M , B
o
M = B
c
M );
where e¯o > e¯c.
6 Equilibrium with two heterogeneous banks
I now investigate the market equilibrium case with bank heterogeneity in monitoring abili-
ties, that is to say one l bank with low cost of monitoring and one h bank with high monitoring
costs where ch = (1 + φ)cl with φ > 0.
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6.1 Contract design stage : High yield compatible
The contract supporting the High type of project has to be such that the Eﬀort Compatibility
(EC) constraint (3) and the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint (4) of the entrepreneur as
well as the Monitoring Constraint (MC) (5) and Participation Constraint (PC) (6) of the bank
is satisﬁed. Using the proﬁtability assumptions, the set of four constraints for an institution
i ∈ {h, l} can be expressed as:
Bi ≤
α− e/∆H
e/∆H +Ri − α
A ≡ BEC (19)
Bi ≤
α− b−epH−pL
b−e
pH−pL
+Ri − α
A ≡ BIC (20)
Bi ≥
ci
∆HRi − ci
A ≡ BiMC (21)
Bi ≥
ci
pHRi − ci − r
A ≡ BiPC (22)
Equations (19) and (20) give the maximum loan amount such that entrepreneurs have respec-
tively no incentives to provide the minimum level of eﬀort and no incentives to divert part of the
resources. Recall that from assumption 6, I have BEC < BIC for the problem to be meaningful.
Equations (21) and (22) give a minimum loan amount as the bank, in order to be incentivised
and make proﬁts, has to cover at least the ﬁxed cost of monitoring, proportional to the size of
collateral/entrepreneur personal investment ciA.
The equilibrium H-type contract is obtained as follows: at the design stage, the bank takes
into account the future choice of the entrepreneur; if the entrepreneur makes the required eﬀort,
he can still compare the H-type contract oﬀered by the high and low ability bank. So each bank
anticipates on the competitive implication of the cost of its own contract.
Assume for the moment that I indeed have :
E1 : BEC ≥ B
i
MC
E2 : BEC ≥ B
i
PC
Since the entrepreneur’s proﬁt is increasing in k, he will seek for the contract that allows for
the maximum leverage, so in order to remain competitive, the bank will have to oﬀer the upper
26
bound on borrowing:
B∗ = BEC (23)
If both the high and low ability bank allow for the maximum leverage demanded by the
entrepreneur, entrepreneurs will choose the contract oﬀering the lowest interest rate. So ex-
ante, the high-ability bank will design a contract that oﬀers an interest rate which would be low
enough to drive the low-ability bank out of the market; recall that the latter is deﬁned by a less
eﬃcient cost structure when operating on the segment of the market that requires monitoring,
so that the more eﬃcient bank will be able to extract a surplus by oﬀering a limit interest rate,
higher than the fair pricing of default risk. From the proﬁtability condition equation (6) for the
two banks, I have the following reaction functions:
Πl + cl(B∗ +A) + r(Rhn)B
∗
pHB∗
= Rln+1 (24)
Πh + ch(B∗ +A) + r(Rln)B
∗
pHB∗
= Rhn+1 (25)
In addition, I know that the market interest rate r(R∗) decreases with the interest on the
loan, since larger interest repayment on loans decreases the amount borrowed (∂B
∗
∂Ri
< 0), and
lower reﬁnancing need by banks reduce the pressure on the capital market and decreases their
ﬁnancing cost r. So for bank i to remain on the market after bank k lowered the interest on
its loan, interest repayment must be realigned such that Rin+1 < R
k\i
n for i, k ∈ {l, h}. So in
equilibrium, the bank most eﬃcient in monitoring will reach Πh = 0 while Πl > 0. Rearranging
equation (25) and plugging in the value of B∗ given in equation (23), I obtain the following
competitive equilibrium interest rate:
R∗ =
r
Q
(26)
whereQ = pH−
cl(1+φ)∆H
α∆H−e
can be thought of as the risk premium adjusted for competition so that
the most eﬃcient bank generates a positive net interest margin which features a countercyclical
markup. R∗ is positive under assumption 7 for c = cpu.
As a consequence, one can verify that equation (E1) holds with an inequality while equation
(E2) holds with equality for the least eﬃcient bank and with an inequality for the most eﬃcient
bank.
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Proposition 5. With two heterogeneous banks, at the effort compatible equilibrium, H-type
projects are financed by the bank with low monitoring cost cl which offers a contract C lH (R
∗
H , B
∗
H)
which successfully mitigates the two sources of moral hazard, with:
B∗H = BEC (φ)
R∗H = r/Q (φ)
under assumptions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7.
The competitive equilibrium with heterogeneous banking is depicted in ﬁgure 6 by point E,
that is to say when the least eﬃcient bank (bank h) with higher monitoring costs ch is driven
out of the market and makes no proﬁt as a result of the competition in contracts.
6.2 Contract design stage : Medium yield compatible
Now that banks have heterogeneous monitoring abilities, a rent can be extracted by the most
eﬃcient one on the H-segment of the market. In principle the M-segment of the market is such
that both banks make zero proﬁts as they are perfectly competitive since banks have the same
opportunity cost of lending (the heterogeneity in monitoring is not relevant for M-projects).
But instead of competing in the M-segment of the market, the most eﬃcient bank which makes
proﬁts on the H-segement of the market will seek to engage on the M-segment of the market
only if does not reduce its proﬁtability. So the design of the M-contract will be subject to a
Proﬁts-Preserving (PP) constraint.
Indeed, with a fairly priced M-contract, it is relatively more attractive than the H-contract
for some entrepreneurs; but the eﬃcient bank, by allowing some degree of market power to the
less eﬃcient bank on the M-segment of the market, would ensure that the M-contract, without
competitive pricing, is now relatively less attractive than the H-contract for some entrepreneurs.
Henceforth, more entrepreneurs would choose H-yield projects, which means more proﬁts for
the eﬃcient bank if it relaxes the competition on the M-segment of the market.
Then the bank with higher monitoring costs will beneﬁt from the market power it gets on
the M-segment of the market and thus will to maximise its now positive proﬁts which are given
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by the following equation:
Πh∗total =
∫ emax
e¯∗
Πhde
=
∫ emax
e¯∗
(pMR
∗
MB
∗
M − rB
∗
M ) de
= (emax − e¯∗) (pMR
∗
M − r)B
∗
M (27)
To pin down the equilibrium interest rate associated with the rent extraction, the less eﬃcient
bank faces the following trade-oﬀ which : by increasing its market power, it extracts more rent
per unit of loan (second term in equation (27)), but the size of each individual loan decreases
(third term) and the number of customers choosing M-projects decreases (ﬁrst term) as H-
supporting contracts become relatively more attractive.
Proposition 6. With two heterogeneous banks, at the non-effort –but incentive– compatible
equilibrium, M-type projects are financed by the low efficiency bank which offers a contract
ChM (R
∗
M , B
∗
M ) that successfully prevents negative NPV projects but fails to provide incentives to
make efforts, with
B∗M = B¯IC
R∗M = argmax
R>r/pM
Πhtotal
under assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 8, and the two sufficient conditions that emax be small enough
and the NPV of the M-project not too high.
The competitive equilibrium on the M-yield segment of the market with heterogeneous
banking is depicted in ﬁgure 7 by point E. If the less eﬃcient bank (bank h for high costs)
lends at a point at the right of A1, then it moves from the competitive case to the case with
a positive markup; by moving from point A1 towards E, the less eﬃcient bank decreases the
attractiveness of its M-contract and de facto increases the proﬁts of the eﬃcient bank on the
H segment of the market. Beyond point E, the less eﬃcient bank increases so much its market
power that it starts making less proﬁts as entrepreneurs do not undertake M-projects any more
or reduce the size of their projects.
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6.3 Contract choice stage : separating equilibrium
As in the case without bank heterogeneity, once contracts have been competitively designed
by the banking sector, entrepreneurs will self-select bank loan contracts in order to maximise
their proﬁts.
Proposition 7. The seperating competitive equilibrium in the presence of bank heterogeneity
(φ > 0) is such that:
– entrepreneurs with a low cost of effort e < e¯∗ will undertake the H-yield project and choose
the contract provided by the bank with low screening costs profile C l∗H (R
∗
H , B
∗
H);
– entrepreneurs with a high cost of effort e > e¯∗ will undertake the M-yield project and
choose the contract provided by the bank with high screening cost profile Ch∗M (R
∗
M , B
∗
M ).
7 Equilibrium with several heterogeneous banks
I now move beyond the speciﬁc duopoly setting by introducing several banks heterogeneous
in their loan monitoring eﬃciency. I still denote by l the bank with the lowest cost of monitoring
but now the ineﬃciency wedge φb for each bank b ∈ {1, ..., n} is such that φb ∈
{
0, φ2, ..., φn
}
and cb ∈
{
c1 = cl, c2, ..., cn
}
.
7.1 Contract design stage : High yield compatible
The same story goes through, that is to say the bank l with the largest comparative ad-
vantage in monitoring loans will take over the whole H-yield market segment and will design
a contract that drives out of the market all its competitors while retaining the largest market
power it can. Thus the equilibrium contract will be pinned down by the competition with bank
b = 2 which is the most eﬃcient in screening loans among the banks b ∈ {2, ..., n} that have an
ineﬃciency wedge.
Thus proposition 6 carries out to the n bank case where the equilibrium contract is given
by the distance φb=2 in terms of eﬃciency between the ﬁrst and the second bank. So the limit
case where n −→∞ is down to proposition 1 with perfect competition.
Proposition 8. With several heterogeneous banks, at the effort compatible equilibrium, H-type
projects are financed by the bank with the lowest monitoring cost cl which offers a contract
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C lH (R
∗∗
H , B
∗∗
H ) which successfully mitigates the two sources of moral hazard, with:
B∗∗H = BEC
(
φb=2
)
R∗∗H = r/Q
(
φb=2
)
under assumptions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7.
7.2 Contract design stage : Medium yield compatible
On the M-yield segment of the market, the situation diﬀers since now n > 2 banks have the
same opportunity cost of lending when no monitoring is undertaken, but only the most eﬃcient
bank b = 1 has a proﬁts preserving constraint. Nevertheless, by refraining from entering the
M-yield segment of the market, this latter bank cannot really impact the competitive pressure
on this segment as it is only one bank among n competitors. Thus two cases have to be
distinguished.
7.2.1 No markup within banking segments
So far the model allowed to derive an endogenous markup across market segments, and in
the speciﬁc duopoly case in each segment of the market. With n heterogeneous banks, the
markup across sector remains and vanishes as the number of banks tends to inﬁnity. But the
markup in the speciﬁc M-yield segment of the market disappears if the n banks competes fully,
so that the equilibrium contract is given, for the interest rate by the fair risk-adjusted interest
rate, and for the loan size by the incentives to undertake the negative NPV project.
7.2.2 Presence of a markup within banking segments
Alternatively, empirical evidences show that the banking sector is not fully competitive
even within speciﬁc lines of business, especially when a small number of banks operate in these
segments. Thus instead of deriving an endogenous market power intensity as in the duopoly
case, the markup ψ would be exogenously given, with ψ = 0 being a speciﬁc case without
markup in the M-yield segment of the market. The case ψ > 0 can be thought of as a result of
Hotelling spacial costs or monopolistic competition with complementarities in banking services.
The following proposition encompasses the two cases.
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Proposition 9. With several heterogeneous banks, at the non-effort –but incentive– compatible
equilibrium, M-type projects can be financed by any bank b where each of them offers the same
contract CbM (R
∗∗
M , B
∗∗
M ) that successfully prevents negative NPV projects but fails to provide
incentives to make efforts, with
B∗∗M = B¯IC
R∗∗M =
r
pM
+ ψ
under assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 8, and the two sufficient conditions that emax be small enough
and the NPV of the M-project not too high. ψ is the intensity of the markup in this market
segment depending on the market structure considered.
In ﬁgure 7, the equilibrium on the M-yield segment of the market with several heterogeneous
banks lies between points A1 and A3 where a larger market power moves the equilibrium away
from A1.
7.3 Contract choice stage : market segmentation
With several banks heterogeneous in their monitoring eﬃciency, the market segmentation
remains, driven by the set of productive choices H,M,L available to entrepreneurs. However,
the equilibrium is only partly separating, with the most eﬃcient bank absorbing the whole
market for high yield entrepreneurs, but all banks are pooled on the M-segment of the market
and an entrepreneur can match randomly with any bank.
Proposition 10. The endogenously segmented competitive equilibrium in the presence of several
heterogeneous banks is such that:
– entrepreneurs with a low cost of effort e < e¯∗∗ will undertake the H-yield project and
choose the contract provided by the most efficient bank C l∗∗H (R
∗∗
H , B
∗∗
H );
– entrepreneurs with a high cost of effort e > e¯∗∗ will undertake the M-yield project and
match randomly with any bank offering the contract Cb∗∗M (R
∗∗
M , B
∗∗
M ).
8 Distortions associated with banking heterogeneity
Although the model presented here is by nature static, the impact of banking heterogeneity
can be analysed along two dimensions, which would correspond, in the terminology of macroe-
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conomists, to long run distortions and short run ﬂuctuations, that is to say comparative statics
of the levels of aggregate variables and of the deviations after a productivity shock. Note that
the modeling strategy employed here does not allow for a quantitative analysis as it assumes a
speciﬁc distribution of entrepreneurs which determines endogenous market shares across bank
eﬃciency.
8.1 Allocative distortions associated with banking heterogeneity shocks
When the intensity of banking heterogeneity increases, that is to say the diﬀerence of bank
eﬃciency in monitoring abilities widens, it increases the rent the most eﬃcient bank can extract
on high ability entrepreneurs, so that it is relatively less attractive for them to remain on the
H-yield, eﬀort-compatible segment of the market, which de facto increases the pool of shirking
entrepreneurs who would have otherwise provided eﬀort. Thus less eﬀort is provided, so that
less high-yield projects are undertaken, which reduces realised aggregate productivity further
compared to the potential aggregate productivity at the social optimum.
Proposition 11. The larger the banking sector heterogeneity in bank monitoring efficiency
between the most efficient and other banks, the stronger the adverse selection towards less pro-
ductive projects allowing for shirking.
Corollary 1. A shock on the distribution of bank monitoring efficiency –i.e. an increase in
banking heterogeneity between the most efficient and other banks– reduces average entrepreneurial
productivity.
When looking at the competitive homogeneous equilibrium versus the heterogeneous bank-
ing equilibrium, two eﬀects on incentives and eﬀort-making work in opposite directions. By
introducing a less eﬃcient bank, you decrease competition on the H-segment of the market and
create a rent for the eﬃcient bank on this segment, which should lower incentives to undertake
eﬀorts. In the meantime, the introduction of the less eﬃcient bank generates a proﬁts-preserving
behaviour for the eﬃcient bank which increases the market power of the less eﬃcient bank on
the M-segment of the market; this should result in lower incentives to shirk and de facto more
incentives to turn to eﬀort-making contracts.
If the intensity ψ of the market power on the M-segment by the less eﬃcient bank is too small,
that is to say if the ﬁnancing condition of the M-contract become too attractive, then there is
an excessive number of entrepreneurs choosing not to undertake eﬀorts. In the meantime, if
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the heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency φ is too high, then having less eﬃcient banks allows for an
excessively high rent to be extracted on the H-segment of the market which will discourage eﬀort.
So the worst case in terms of the distortions induced by banking heterogeneity on eﬀort making,
which channels via the adverse selection process, would be a very high level of heterogeneity
in monitoring eﬃciency and high market competition in the non-eﬀort making segment of the
market.
Proposition 12. The introduction of heterogeneity in bank screening efficiency (φb > 0) in a
sector with two or more banks compared to the competitive equilibrium without bank heterogeneity
is such that it distorts effort making incentives towards less productive projects (i) when bank
heterogeneity in monitoring efficiency between the most efficient bank and the other one(s) is
high and (ii) when the market power of the less inefficient bank(s) is low.
Proposition 13. The introduction of heterogeneity in bank screening efficiency (φb > 0) in a
sector with two or more banks compared to the competitive equilibrium without bank heterogeneity
is such that it reallocates resources away from entrepreneurs towards banks by (i) deteriorating
the financing conditions of effort (high yield) making entrepreneurs and (ii) deteriorating the
financing conditions of non-effort (medium yield) making entrepreneurs when the markup is
endogenously given by the profits preserving constraint in the duopoly setting.
Proposition 14. The introduction of heterogeneity in bank screening efficiency (φb > 0) in
a sector with two or more banks compared to the social optimum is such that it distorts effort
making on behalf of entrepreneurs.
Proposition 15. The introduction of heterogeneity in bank screening efficiency (φb > 0) in
a sector with two or more banks compared to the social optimum is such that it reallocates
resources away from effort making entrepreneurs; (i) it deteriorates the financing conditions of
effort making entrepreneurs but (ii) may improve financing conditions of the non-effort making
entrepreneurs if the less efficient banks face a low enough market power.
So the presence of less eﬃcient banks operating on the non-eﬀort compatible segment of the
market increases moral hazard (the extensive margin) as well as favours the missallocation of
resources (the intensive margin).
Figure 8 pictures the two margins of the model with the two equilibrium, H and M-type,
respectively for eﬃcient and less eﬃcient banks. The lower graph shows the model when there
34
Figure 8: Model with (up) and without (down) banking heterogeneity
is no banking heterogeneity, that is to say with no diﬀerence in the cost of monitoring; the
arrow on the e axis represents the extensive margin of introducing ineﬃcient banks: without
bank heterogeneity, adverse selection is reduced and more entrepreneurs choose eﬀort-inducing
contracts. The arrows on the B axis represent the intensive margin of introducing ineﬃcient
banks: without bank heterogeneity, credits are concentrated on more productive ﬁrms.
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8.2 Productivity fluctuations and banking heterogeneity
8.2.1 Moral hazard as the standard source of lending fluctuations
The competitive benchmark without banking heterogeneity already pictures the traditional
source of procyclicality explored by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) due to the fact that moral
hazard is less severe when the productivity increases because it becomes relatively less attractive
to shirk as the return of not diverting funds or making eﬀort increases faster.
Proposition 16. At the individual level, when a positive productivity shock hits, whether or
not the economy features bank heterogeneity, loan contracts for high or medium yield projects
become more attractive.
8.2.2 Heterogeneous aggregate lending fluctuations
When one departs from the traditional benchmark which assumes a single positive NPV
project, the model features heterogeneous lending ﬂuctuations which are speciﬁc to each project,
and this speciﬁcity spills over to the banks that ﬁnance each sector; introducing an ineﬃcient
monitoring externality creates a heterogeneous response of aggregate lending after a productivity
shock. This is consistent with the fact that all banks do not necessarily modify their lending
volume at the same pace.
Proposition 17. At the individual level, when a positive productivity shock hits, whether or
not the economy features bank heterogeneity :
– due to adverse selection, the mass of firms undertaking H-projects increases while the mass
of firms undertaking M-projects decreases;
– due to moral hazard, M-yield loan contracts improve less than H-yield loan contracts,
under the sufficient condition that the market power ψ on the M-segment of the market
be large enough.
Corollary 2. At the aggregate level, when a productivity shock hits, whether or not the economy
features bank heterogeneity, (i) lending to effort making –high yield– entrepreneurs increases
while (ii) lending to low effort making –medium yield– entrepreneurs increases less, under the
sufficient condition that the markup on the M-segment of the market be large enough.
Corollary 3. If the banking sector is heterogeneous in its screening abilities, the less efficient
banks are the ones whose aggregate lending conditions fluctuate less as a result of productivity
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shocks.
Corollary 3 simply re-states corollary 2 to say that heterogeneous lending ﬂuctuations are not
driven directly by the heterogeneity in the banking industry, but rather reﬂect the endogenous
market segmentation in the banking industry which is derived from the heterogeneity in the
productive sector.
Two eﬀects are combined in order to obtain the aggregate cyclical pattern of eﬃcient versus
less eﬃcient bank lending; due to moral hazard, eﬃcient bank loans are more reactive to a
productivity shock because the amount lent to the entrepreneur needs to implement adequate
incentives : with a lower productivity, eﬀort making entrepreneurs have relatively more to lose
than non-eﬀort making ones, such that the eﬃcient bank will decrease its loan size relatively
faster than the less eﬃcient banks to make sure the incentive constraint is still met. Then
with a lower productivity, adverse selection will worsen such that the attractiveness of the
eﬀort-making contract for some entrepreneur will decrease since they have relatively less to
gain by paying the cost of eﬀort. So the marginal entrepreneur will switch from eﬃcient to less
eﬃcient bank contracts as he will be now better oﬀ decreasing its eﬀort intensity; the mass of
entrepreneurs asking for eﬃcient bank loans decreases in case of bad productivity shock, and
each eﬃcient bank loan contract reacts more to the shock, so that the two eﬀects go in the same
direction: aggregate lending by the most eﬃcient bank decreases when the economy is hit by a
negative productivity shock, i.e. it is procyclical. Conversely, for less eﬃcient banks, the eﬀect
is ambiguous, with more entrepreneurs choosing less eﬃcient bank loans in bad times, but still a
lower loan oﬀer per individual. Less eﬃcient bank loans are then less responsive to productivity
shocks than eﬃcient bank ones, but may be either acyclical or countercyclical depending on the
speciﬁcities of the banking sector, especially the markup on the M-yield segment of the market.
Conjecture 1. Banks featuring a lower cyclicality of their aggregate lending may not be desir-
able as it may signal a lower efficiency in their monitoring abilities, and thus a specialisation
in loans to less-able entrepreneurs.
8.2.3 Bank heterogeneity as an additional source of lending fluctuation
The model presented here includes an additional source of ﬂuctuation after a productivity
shock because of the presence of banking heterogeneity.
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Corollary 4. At the individual level, when a positive productivity shock hits, the additional
effect of increasing banking heterogeneity is such that the mass of firms undertaking High yield
projects increases relatively more rapidly due to adverse selection.
Indeed, the ﬁrst order eﬀect is such that the markup on the H-segment of the market
1
Q∗∗ increases when banking heterogeneity increases, that is to say when the eﬃciency gap
in monitoring technologies increases compared to the most eﬃcient bank. But the markup
decreases when productivity increases, because the intensity of the competition between banks
increases in order to ﬁnance increasingly proﬁtable H projects relative to M-yield ones.
Now the second order eﬀect is such that this markup reduces relatively faster when the
banking heterogeneity marginally increases after a positive productivity shock. Indeed more
banking heterogeneity means less competition, more rent extraction and consequently lower
loan size asked by entrepreneurs. Thus the marginal proﬁt of the eﬃcient bank it retrieves from
a positive productivity shock decreases as entrepreneurs ask for relatively less loans. Henceforth,
the diﬀerence of proﬁtability between the most eﬃcient bank and the less eﬃcient competitors
is marginally smaller, which is equivalent to a tightening of the competition and a reduction of
the markup at the margin, even if the latter increases in absolute amounts.
The above proposition states that more banking heterogeneity marginally increases the ﬂuc-
tuations of individual lending to eﬀort making entrepreneurs after a positive productivity shock.
But banking heterogeneity has an ambiguous impact on the ﬂuctuation of average productivity
following a positive productivity shock, as it indeed increases relatively faster the pool of eﬀort
making entrepreneurs undertaking H-yield projects, but increasing banking heterogeneity also
exacerbates adverse selection and reduces the pool of eﬀort making entrepreneurs.
Corollary 5. When a positive productivity shock hits, the additional effect of increasing banking
heterogeneity on average productivity fluctuation is ambiguous.
Proposition 18. When a productivity shock hits, in an economy with several heterogeneous
banks, the pool of effort-making entrepreneurs is less volatile compared to the social optimum,
provided that the private benefit of not behaving is not too high.
The reason for the restriction of proposition 18 goes as follows; if the private beneﬁt was
too high, the less eﬃcient banks on the M-segment of the market would have to oﬀer relatively
less attractive loans when a negative shock hits, because otherwise the entrepreneur would be
better oﬀ diverting funds from a large loan when the return on behaving is low. Then as a
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result, if private beneﬁts were excessively high, relatively less entrepreneurs would be attracted
by Medium-yield contracts whose conditions are deteriorating faster; so, compared to the social
optimum, below a certain threshold of private beneﬁts, this eﬀect is dominated for sure, which
means a lower volatility of the pool of eﬀort-making entrepreneurs.
9 Numerical Simulation
I now provide some numerical simulations of the general model of n banks for diﬀerent
intensities of the banking heterogeneity in monitoring eﬃciency and diﬀerent market structures
associated with more or less competition. Table 1 shows the speciﬁc parametrisation used
thereafter, which satisﬁes assumptions 1 to 8.
9.1 Mechanics of the model
Graph 9 and 10 describes the mechanics inherent to the model. The vertical lines represent
the threshold entrepreneur which is indiﬀerent between undertaking a H-yield project while
paying the cost of eﬀort or undertaking a lower M-yield project where the eﬀort cost is reduced.
Thus this line separates the market into two components; to the left of the distribution, all
entrepreneurs with a small cost of eﬀort ask a loan to the most eﬃcient bank, and to the right
of the line, entrepreneurs with a larger cost of eﬀort are not incentivised to pick the largest
positive NPV project and obtain a loan from the less eﬃcient banks.
Note that the competitive equilibrium without banking heterogeneity is already a second best
and fails to maximise aggregate surplus due to the existence of an externality: the banks do not
internalise the implication of bank competition in contracts on the decision of the entrepreneurs
who will have diﬀerent incentives to undertake eﬀort or not depending on the set of contracts
being oﬀered to them.
One can readily see that the introduction of banking heterogeneity introduces an additional
wedge both in terms of allocative and incentive distortions, which can be understood as an
additional externality created by the existence of diﬀerences in monitoring abilities, which is in
fact a positive externality for the most eﬃcient bank as it allows it to extract a rent from its
dominant position, but a negative externality at the social level as banks fail to factor in the
eﬀort incentives implications. Compared to the banking system without banking heterogeneity
or to the optimal benchmark, on the one hand, the loan size oﬀered to High yield entrepreneurs
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is lower after the introduction of banking heterogeneity, and on the other hand the number of
entrepreneurs deciding to provide suﬃcient eﬀort to undertake the project with the largest social
net present value is reduced and the threshold entrepreneur moves to the left of the distribution.
9.2 Allocative distortions and bank-level fluctuations
Then the next set of pictures shows the evolution of the two types of distortions as a function
of the productivity parameter and the magnitude of the ﬂuctuation when banking heterogeneity
increases.
Graph 11 pictures the extensive margin which comes from the adverse selection problem.
When a productivity shock hits, the mass of entrepreneurs evolves along the e axis: adverse
selection will worsen in time of crisis, such that the fringe of entrepreneurs in the middle of the
distribution will ﬁnd it less proﬁtable to behave and may no longer be willing to pay the cost
of eﬀort relative to lower productivity levels. Henceforth, some entrepreneurs will ﬁnd it more
proﬁtable to deviate and relax the pressure of the monitoring by switching to eﬀort-free packages
oﬀered by less eﬃcient banks, that is to say switching from the red area to the blue+cyan one,
where the cyan area corresponds to the range of entrepreneurs which would have chosen to
undertake eﬀort at the optimum. So, in the terminology of macroeconomists, the mass of firms
financed by less efficient banks is countercyclical. In addition, it can be readily seen by observing
the slopes of the threshold entrepreneur that an increase in banking heterogeneity increases the
ﬂuctuations in the incentives to make eﬀort as a result of a shock on productivity.
In addition, graphs 12 and 13 picture the intensive margin respectively on the H and M-
segment of the market, which arises as a result of the moral hazard present in the model;
when a productivity shock hits, the size of the loan oﬀered to eﬀort-making entrepreneur will
decrease faster since the eﬀort compatibility constraint will be tightening faster as eﬀort-making
entrepreneurs have relatively more to lose (pHα versus pMα). So loan size offered by less efficient
banks will be less procyclical than the one of efficient banks, which can be readily seen on the
graph: the slope of loan size provided by the eﬃcient bank on the H segment of the market
is larger than the slope of loan size provided by less eﬃcient banks on the M segment of the
market.
40
9.3 Aggregate fluctuations of productivity and lending
I now turn to the description of the implication of the model on productivity levels and
aggregate ﬂuctuations when banking heterogeneity increases and for diﬀerent intensities of the
markup in the banking industry in the M-segment of the market 7.
Pictures 14 and 15 show the impact of banking heterogeneity on respectively average and
weighted average productivity. Note that realised productivity is diﬀerent from the common
productivity parameter α, as each entrepreneur, given the productivity level common to the
whole economy, can decide to choose a higher or lower productivity project depending on its
individual return of providing eﬀort. When banking heterogeneity increases, due to the rent
extraction and the resulting adverse selection, less entrepreneurs are ready to make eﬀorts so
that average realised productivity across entrepreneurs decreases, that is to say the productivity
of an average entrepreneur in the economy decreases. Likewise, as the surplus is captured away
from entrepreneurs, only a smaller loan size can sustain eﬀort compatibility because of the
presence of moral hazard; so the two eﬀects are combined and more banking heterogeneity
leads to lower realised weighted average productivity, that is to say the average productivity
level observed in the economy while weighting by projects size of each entrepreneur.
Now when the markup in the M-segment of the market increases, that is to say the com-
petition for the ﬁnancing of the Medium-yield projects is not perfect and less eﬃcient banks
still extract a rent, the average or aggregate productivity increases despite the presence of
banking heterogeneity. This arises as it reduces the relative gap between H or M-compatible
contracts: the M-contract becomes less attractive so that entrepreneurs have less incentives to
pick a Medium yield project as the opportunity cost of making eﬀort decreases. Thus some
entrepreneurs will be better oﬀ undertaking H-yield projects despite the presence of the en-
dogenous markup introduced by banking heterogeneity: a markup in the main segment of the
market can get the extensive margin right so that more entrepreneurs choose to undertake high
yield projects in the niche, but at the cost of a depressed intensive margin with additional rent
extraction. Thus a high enough markup in the market for medium yield projects can push
the realised weighted average productivity of the economy close to the optimum, which is but
detrimental to total production.
Then ﬁgure 16 pictures the aggregate lending of the whole economy, after aggregating the
7. The markup in the M-segment of the market is derived endogenously only in the specific duopoly case,
while the markup on the H-segment of the market –the most important one corresponding to effort decisions– is
always endogenously pinned down.
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two segments of the market, that is to say taking the integral of bank loans over the whole range
of entrepreneurs. It clearly shows that introducing banking heterogeneity, via both the intensive
and extensive margins discussed above, leads to a lower level of aggregate lending compared to
the situation without heterogeneity in banking eﬃciency. Note that aggregate lending could be
larger in the competitive case as opposed to the optimal situation, as aggregate lending volumes
is not suﬃcient to ensure allocative eﬃciency across entrepreneurs willing or not to make eﬀort.
If competition is not perfect in the M-segment of the market for less productive projects,
aggregate lending volumes further decrease; indeed, more entrepreneurs undertake High yield
projects, but the size of loans to each non-eﬀort making entrepreneurs is reduced as their smaller
surplus cannot prevent them from deviating and shirking if the loan size they get is not reduced.
Moreover, whether the endogenous markup on the H-segment of the market or the exogenous
(endogenous if n=2) markup on the M-segment increases, the response of aggregate lending to
a productivity shock decreases and gets "less procyclical". Thus this conﬁrms conjecture 1
stated at the bank level: a lower cyclicality of aggregate bank lending may signal a larger
heterogeneity in the eﬃciency of bank monitoring abilities, which is shown to be detrimental to
average productivity; as attractive a lower volatility might seem, it may be the counterpart of
allocative and incentives distortions.
Conjecture 2. A banking system featuring a lower cyclicality of aggregate lending might not
be desirable as it may signal allocative and incentives distortions steaming from banking hetero-
geneity in bank monitoring efficiencies.
Last, ﬁgure 17 displays the total output produced in each case. As expected, the case of fully
homogeneous and thus competitive banking is already a second best compared to the optimum
where all entrepreneurs that can make eﬀort use their full potential, while introducing banking
heterogeneity reduces total output, which is further reduced when the competition between
banks on the main segment of the market becomes oligopolistic.
10 Conclusion
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to connect heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency with lending ﬂuctu-
ations and allocative eﬃciency in an endogenously fragmented market for loans. The presence
of banking heterogeneity in monitoring costs highlights a trade-oﬀ between a lower reaction of
aggregate lending to productivity shocks and a larger missallocation of ressources towards a
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growing pool of less productive entrepreneurs. In essence, introducing a wedge in monitoring
eﬃciencies on the market that requires monitoring is akin to an externality as it spills over
to markets which do not require monitoring, and thus modify bank loan contracts even when
monitoring is not required. When the banking heterogeneity in monitoring eﬃciency increases,
an endogenous niche arises as a result of moral hazard and adverse selection, which can explain
the observed heterogeneity in individual bank lending ﬂuctuations. Moreover this endogenous
market segmentation is directly connected to the introduction of two positive NPV projects,
which departs form standard corporate ﬁnance theory that would otherwise overlook the eﬀect
of banking heterogeneity and market fragmentation. Thus lending ﬂuctuations on the diﬀerent
segments of the market become heterogeneous and the rent extraction diﬀerential across market
segments turns out to be detrimental to allocation eﬃciency.
The next step to study the question at hand, namely the eﬀect of monitoring heterogeneity
on both the cyclical dimension and cross-sectional allocation, would be to integrate the one
period model into a multi-period general equilibrium model ; such a framework would be able
to go beyond the mere comparative statics of the eﬀect of productivity shocks, in order to
analyse the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the whole business cycle. Then successive periods would
allow for proper lending relationship, i.e. the introduction of a cost of switching over time from
a bank in a niche to another bank loan contract; this eﬀect is likely to dampen the impact of
banking heterogeneity on lending ﬂuctuations. In addition, adding entrepreneurs’ entry to the
model would require to add some heterogeneity among the medium-yield entrepreneurs –which
are ex-post identical–, so that some of them would prefer not to enter the productive sector.
But the analysis would likely go through, depending partly on the relative magnitude of the
switching and exiting decisions.
Taking stock of the model and its simulations, one should be cautious when observing less
cyclical lending ﬂuctuations, both at the bank or country-wide level. Here, heterogeneity in bank
lending ﬂuctuations reﬂects the heterogeneity on the asset side with projects of both variable
proﬁtability and variable costs ; then heterogeneity in bank monitoring eﬃciency explains why
certain banks would specialise in some segment of the market rather than serve the whole
market. Henceforth, banks featuring a lower cyclicality of their aggregate lending may not be
desirable as it may signal a lower eﬃciency in their monitoring abilities. Likewise, a banking
system featuring a lower cyclicality of aggregate lending might not be desirable as it may
signal allocative and incentives distortions steaming from banking heterogeneity in monitoring
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eﬃciencies. As a result, the presence of heterogeneity decreases average productivity as it
increases adverse selection by entrepreneurs as well as favours rent extractions by banks.
In terms of policy implications when implementing structural reforms of a banking sector,
three pitfalls should be avoided; ﬁrst, the model that replicates new stylised facts on banking
heterogeneity calls for more caution in terms of supporting structures associated with more
stable aggregate lending as it may come as a result of a monitoring ineﬃciency externality.
Second, when one carries out analyses aiming at investigating the eﬃciency of the banking sector
to channel resources to the most promising projects, one should consider not only overall banking
eﬃciency but also look at the cross-sectional distribution of banks as average banking eﬃciency
is not enough to ensure productive eﬃciency. Last, reforms implementing new regulations
which would have an impact on monitoring or screening incentives (such as capital or liquidity
regulation) should also be careful not to increase banking heterogeneity that would create
possibilities of rent extractions by some institutions and distort the adverse selection process
by borrowers.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. The threshold entrepreneur e¯c above which entrepreneurs choose to un-
dertake the M-yield project is given by :
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M
b
∆M
b
∆M
+ Rc
M
− α
≥ e
pM
∆H
e
(
pH
r∆H
pMR
c
M
b
∆M
b
∆M
+ Rc
M
− α
−
pM
∆H
)
≥
(
αpH−c
r
+ 1
)
pMR
c
M
b
∆M
b
∆M
+ Rc
M
− α
e
∆H
(
pHpMR
c
M
b
r∆M
− pM (
b
∆M
+ R
c
M − α)
)
≥
pMR
c
M
b
r∆M
(αpH − c− r)
e ≥ ∆H
αpH − c− r
pH −
r∆M
b
− r
Rc
M
(1−
∆Mα
b
)
(28)
Replacing the interest rate RcM =
r
pM
in equation (28) –which gives the expression for the
threshold entrepreneur being indiﬀerent between the H or M-segment of the market:
e ≥
b∆H
∆M
(αpH − c− r)
pHb
∆M
− pM (
b
∆M
+ r
pM
− α)
e ≥
∆H (αpH − c− r)
pH −
pM∆M
b
( b
∆M
+ r
pM
− α)
e ≥
∆H (αpH − c− r)
∆H − r
∆M
b
+ αpM
∆M
b
≡ e¯
c
So in the fully competitive case, entrepreneurs below the threshold e¯c will choose the H-contract
which implements eﬀort.
Proof of Proposition 4. The contract that maximises the surplus of entrepreneurs on the H-
segment of the market is the same as the one showed in Proposition 1; likewise the size of the
loan ﬁnancing M-yield projects is given as in proposition 2. But now, in order to make sure all
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entrepreneurs who can undertake eﬀort are properly incentivised, the M-contract is designed
such that the marginal entrepreneur able to make eﬀort e¯o ≡ α∆H − c > e¯
c ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to choose the H-contract which is eﬀort compatible. Since BoM = B¯IC , R
o
M is chosen such that
for entrepreneur e¯o:
CoH(R
o
H , B
o
H) ≻ C
o
M (R
o
M , B
o
M )
pH (α(B
o
H +A)−R
o
HB
o
H)− e¯
okoH ≥ pM (α(B
o
M +A)−R
o
MB
o
M )
RoM =
pMα+
(pMα−r)
pM
∆H
c
r−
pM
∆H
c
pM +
(pMα−r)
pM
∆H
c
(r−
pM
∆H
c)(α− b
∆M
)
Proof of Proposition 6. The loan size B∗M is obtained as in proposition 2 in the absence of bank
heterogeneity since the proﬁts of individual entrepreneurs is increasing in loan size and B¯IC is
the maximal amount which can sustain a positive NPV project.
The interest rate R∗M is obtained as follows. First recognize that the bank with high abilities
and lower monitoring costs has an incentive not to enter the M-segment of the market as it is
proﬁts improving for the rent it derives from the H-yield segment of the market. The marginal
entrepreneur indiﬀerent between H or M-types of contracts is derived as in proposition 3 such
that:
ChM (R,B
∗
M ) ≻ C
l
H(R
∗
H , B
∗
H)
pM (α(B
∗
M +A)−RB
∗
M ) ≥ pH (α(B
∗
H +A)−R
∗
HB
∗
H)− ek
∗
H
e ≥ ∆H
αpH − c
h − r
pH −
r∆M
b −
r
R(1−
∆Mα
b )
≡ e¯∗ (29)
The eﬃcient bank may now decide not to make M-loans if by doing so it is able to attract
more entrepreneurs willing to enter an H-contract, that is to say if some entrepreneurs close to
the threshold decide to switch from M-yield to H-yield projects when the market power on the
M-segment of the market increases so that the interest rate R∗M increases above its competitive
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value rpM . That is to say one must have:
∂e¯∗
∂R
> 0
∆H(αpH − c
pu − r)
r
R2
∆Mα−b
b
(pH −
r∆M
b −
r
R(1−
∆Mα
b ))
2
> 0
which is indeed positive from assumption 4, so that the more eﬃcient bank indeed has an
incentive to allow for a rent to be extracted by the ineﬃcient bank with an oﬀered interest rate
R∗M =
r
pM
+ψ above the competitive one, with ψ being the intensity of the market power to be
determined next.
Second, once the less eﬃcient bank is left on the M-segment of the market with some market
power, it will decide to maximise its now positive proﬁts over the whole range of entrepreneurs
choosing M-yield projects.
max
R>r/pM
Πhtotal ↔ max
R>r/pM
(emax − e¯∗) (pMR− r)B
∗
M (30)
The ﬁrst derivative is given by:
∂Πhtotal
∂R
= −
e¯∗
∂R
(pMR− r)B
∗
M + (e
max − e¯∗)
(
pMB
∗
M + (pMR− r)
∂B∗M
∂R
)
In order to show that there indeed exist a maximum proﬁt for R∗M , I ﬁrst show that starting at
the competitive equilibrium where ψ = 0, marginal proﬁts are positive if the interest rate was to
increase, i.e. the market power ψ increases. Then I show that for ψ →∞, marginal proﬁts tend
to zero from negative values. Thus if proﬁts starting at zero initially increase and then decrease,
provided the variables are continuous, there indeed exists a positive markup which maximises
aggregate proﬁts of the less eﬃcient bank for an interest rate R∗M = r/pM + psi
∗ > r/pM .
– for ψ = 0, pMR = r so that I indeed have:
∂Πhtotal
∂R
= (emax − e¯∗) pMB
∗
M > 0
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– for ψ →∞, notice that the ﬁrst term of
∂Πh
total
∂R tends to 0 by negative values since:
lim
ψ→∞
e¯∗
∂R
= 0+
lim
ψ→∞
(pMR− r)B
∗
M =
α− b/∆M
1
pM−r/R
− α−b/∆MpMR−r
A
= pM (α−
b
∆M
)A
then for the second term of
∂Πh
total
∂R :
lim
ψ→∞
(emax − e¯∗) = emax −∆H
αpH − c
h − r
pH −
r∆M
b
< 0
which is negative for emax suﬃciently small, and :
lim
ψ→∞
(
pMB
∗
M + (pMR− r)
∂B∗M
∂R
)
= pM
α− b∆M
R− (α− b∆M )
A−
(pMR− r)
(
α− b∆M
)
(
R− (α− b∆M )
)2 A
= lim
ψ→∞
(
α−
b
∆M
)
A
r − pM
(
α− b∆M
)
R−
(
α− b∆M
)2
= 0+
from assumption 4 and provided that the NPV of the M project is not too high pMα−r <
pM
b
∆M
.
Proof of Proposition 7. The cutoﬀ entrepreneur e¯∗, given in the proof of proposition 6, is such
that e > e¯∗ ⇔ C∗hM (R
∗
M , B
∗
M ) ≻ C
∗l
H(R
∗
H , B
∗
H) where {h, l} represent respectively the high
monitoring cost or ineﬃcient bank and the low monitoring cost or eﬃcient bank.
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Proof of Proposition 10.
ChM (R
∗∗
M , B
∗∗
M ) ≻ C
l
H(R
∗∗
H , B
∗
H)
pM (α(B
∗∗
M +A)−R
∗∗
MB
∗∗
M ) ≥ pH (α(B
∗∗
H +A)−R
∗∗
HB
∗∗
H )− ek
∗∗
H
e ≥ ∆H
αpH − c
l(1 + φb=2)− r
pH −
r∆M
b −
r
R∗∗
M
(1− ∆Mαb )
e ≥ ∆H
αpH − c
l(1 + φb=2)− r
pH −
r∆M
b +
r
r
pM
+ψ (
∆Mα
b − 1)
≡ e¯∗∗
Proof of Proposition 11. The intensity of bank ineﬃciency in monitoring is measured by φ:
– in the duopoly case, ch = cl(1 + φ) with φ > 0; it follows from proposition 7 that ∂e¯
∗
∂φ < 0
– in the case with n banks, cb=2 = cl(1 + φb=2) with cb ∈
{
cl, cb=2, ..., cb=n
}
and φb ∈{
0, φb=2, ..., φb=n
}
; it follows from proposition 10 that ∂e¯
∗∗
∂φ < 0
so the larger the ineﬃciency, the smaller the range of eﬀort making entrepreneurs given by
e¯∗ − emin or e¯
∗∗ − emin. So more heterogeneity in screening eﬃciency between the ﬁrst two
banks ranked by monitoring eﬃciency means stronger adverse selection towards less productive
projects.
Proof of Corollary 1. Average productivity varies when the intensity of the heterogeneity in the
banking sector φ increases. In the duopoly case:
∂
∂φ
(
α
pH ∗ (e¯
∗ − emin) + pM ∗ (e
max − e¯∗)
emax − emin
)
=
α
emax − emin
(pH − pM )
∂e¯∗
∂φ
< 0 (31)
where it follows from proposition 11 that ∂e¯
∗
∂φ < 0. Likewise for e¯
∗∗ in the case of n heterogeneous
banks.
Proof of Proposition 12. Banking heterogeneity distorts eﬀort making incentives in the follow-
ing two cases:
– It follows from propositions 3 and 7 that bank heterogeneity in bank eﬃciency distorts
incentives and increases adverse selection towards non-eﬀort compatible contracts if I have
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e¯c > e¯∗ :
e¯
c
> e¯
∗
∆H (αpH − c
l − r)
∆H − r
∆M
b
+ αpM
∆M
b
> ∆H
αpH − c
l(1 + φ)− r
pH −
r∆M
b
− r
R∗
M
(1−
∆Mα
b
)
(αpH − c
l
− r)(−
r
R∗
M
(1−
∆Mα
b
) + pM − pM
α∆M
b
) > −c
l
φ(∆H − r
∆M
b
+ αpM
∆M
b
)
(αpH − c
l
− r)(pM −
r
R∗
M
)(1−
∆Mα
b
) > −c
l
φ(∆H − r
∆M
b
+ αpM
∆M
b
)
The left hand side of the last expression is negative (ﬁrst term positive, second positive
since R∗M >
r
pM
, and third negative from assumption 4) but the right hand side is negative
as well. In fact two eﬀects work in opposite directions. By introducing an ineﬃcient bank,
you decrease competition on the H-segment of the market and create a rent for the eﬃcient
bank on this segment, which should lower incentives to undertake eﬀorts. In the meantime,
this proﬁts-preserving behaviour for the eﬃcient bank increases the market power of the
ineﬃcient bank on the M-segment of the market, which should result in lower incentives
to shirk and de facto more incentives to turn to eﬀort making contracts.
Recall that the cost of monitoring of the less eﬃcient bank is given by ch = cl(1+φ) such
that φ is an index of bank monitoring eﬃciency when there is bank heterogeneity. If φ
is too high, then more banking heterogeneity will allow for an excessively high rent to
be extracted on the H-segment of the market which will discourage eﬀort so that indeed
e¯c > e¯∗. The same analysis applies in the case of n heterogeneous banks, with e¯c > e¯∗∗.
– Recall that R∗M =
r
pM
+ ψ with ψ the intensity of the market power on the M-segment
of the market which is endogenously determined in proposition 6 for the duopoly case.
If ψ is too small, that is to say if the ﬁnancing condition of the M-contract becomes too
attractive then e¯c > e¯∗, that is too say there is an excessive number of entrepreneurs
choosing not to undertake eﬀorts in the case with bank heterogeneity.
Proof of Proposition 13. It follows from Proposition 3 that banks do not extract any rent
in the fully competitive case and oﬀer fair contracts.
Banking heterogeneity deteriorates the loan contracts oﬀered to high yield entrepreneurs
as banks extract a rent.
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Alternatively, one can see that, for the duopoly case:
∂B∗H
∂φ
=
∂B∗H
∂R∗H
∂R∗H
∂Q
∂Q
∂φ
< 0
Likewise for the case of n heterogeneous banks:
∂B∗∗H
∂φ
=
∂B∗∗H
∂R∗∗H
∂R∗∗H
∂Q
∂Q
∂φb=2
< 0
– Banking heterogeneity deteriorates the loan contracts oﬀered to medium yield entrepreneurs
if it allows banks to extract a rent; in the speciﬁc duopoly case, banking heterogeneity
endogenously creates a markup in the M-yield segment of the market due to the proﬁts
preserving constraint. So from the equilibrium loan size on the M-segment of the market
given by the Incentive Compatibility constraint, one has:
B¯IC
(
B∗M =
r
pM
>
r
pM
)
< B¯IC
(
BcM =
r
pM
)
⇔ B∗M < B
c
M
But in the case with several heterogeneous banks, the equilibrium loan contract on the
M-segment of the market does not deteriorate when heterogeneity increases but does
deteriorate due to the presence of the markup in banking which is not expressively modeled
as an endogenous outcome of banking heterogeneity:
∂B∗∗M
∂φ
=
∂B∗∗M
∂R∗∗M
∂R∗∗M
∂φb=2
= 0
B¯IC
(
B∗∗M =
r
pM + ψ
>
r
pM
)
< B¯IC
(
BcM =
r
pM
)
⇔ B∗∗M < B
c
M
Proof of Proposition 14. It follows from the deﬁnition of the optimum in proposition 4 that
entrepreneurs above e¯o could never realise a surplus suﬃcient enough to cover their cost of
eﬀort and compensate the bank for the monitoring cost, so that this gives an upper bound to
the entrepreneurs which could decide to choose H or M. So in the case of banking heterogeneity,
the eﬃcient bank cannot expect to attract entrepreneurs above e¯o by allowing for additional
market power on the M-segment of the market, so that one necessarily have the following
inequality e¯∗ < e¯o whatever the intensity of market power on the M-segment of the market.
The inequality is strict as the rent extraction on the H-segment due to the presence of a less
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eﬃcient bank makes the most eﬃcient bank ask for a compensation strictly higher than its cost
of monitoring, while, at the optimum e¯o, only a fair compensation of the monitoring cost c is
considered. Henceforth, together with proposition 12, I have e¯∗ (R∗M ) < e¯
c (RcM ) < e¯
o (RoM ).
So the range of entrepreneurs [e¯∗, e¯o] fails to provide eﬀort in case of heterogeneity in bank
monitoring eﬃciency. The same argument applies to the case of n heterogeneous banks.
Proof of Proposition 15. From proposition 5 or 8, it is obvious that introducing bank hetero-
geneity within two or more banks creates a rent on the H-segment of the market so that it
deteriorates the ﬁnancing conditions of high yield projects undertaken by eﬀort making en-
trepreneurs.
In the optimal case, the key variable is RoM >
r
pM
which is used to introduce a wedge
high enough to discourage entrepreneurs from self-selecting M-yield projects. So depending on
the intensity of the market power ψ available to the ineﬃcient bank on the M-segment of the
market, one can have RoM > R
∗
M in which case the ﬁnancing conditions of non-eﬀort making
entrepreneurs is improved. The same argument applies to the case of several heterogeneous
banks.
Proof of Proposition 16. The same proof holds if I consider the fully competitive economy with-
out bank heterogeneity, that is to say by setting φb = 0. I consider here the economy with
banking heterogeneity.
– The interest rate oﬀered by the most eﬃcient banks decreases when a productivity shock
hits:
∂R∗∗H
∂α
=
∂
∂α
r
pH −
ch∆H
α∆H−e
= −
rch
(pH −
ch∆H
α∆H−e
)2(α− e/∆H)2
< 0
which comes from the fact that the markup 1Q∗∗ is countercyclical. So individual loan size
oﬀered by the most eﬃcient bank is positively associated with productivity shocks:
∂B∗∗H
∂α
=
∂B∗∗H
∂R∗∗H
∂R∗∗H
∂α
> 0
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– Individual loan size oﬀered by less eﬃcient bank increases when a productivity shock hits:
∂B∗∗M
∂α
=
∂ α−b/∆M(b/∆M+R∗∗M−α)
A
∂α
=
(b/∆M +R
∗∗
M − α) + (α− b/∆M )
(b/∆M +R∗∗M − α)
2
A
=
R∗∗M
(b/∆M +R∗∗M − α)
2
A
> 0
Proof of Proposition 17. The same proof holds if I consider the fully competitive economy with-
out bank heterogeneity, that is to say by setting φb = 0.
– Due to adverse selection, the mass of ﬁrms undertaking H-projects increases when a
productivity shock hits:
∂(e¯∗∗ − emin)
∂α
=
∂e¯∗∗
α
> 0
∆H
pH(pH −
r∆M
b −
r
R∗∗
M
(1− ∆Mαb ))− (αpH − c
b=2 − r) r∆MbR∗∗
M
(pH −
r∆M
b −
r
R∗∗
M
(1− ∆Mαb ))
2
> 0
p2H − pH
r
R∗∗M
−
pHr∆M
b
+ cb=2
r∆M
bR∗∗M
+
r2∆M
bR∗∗M
> 0
pH(pH −
r
R∗∗M
) +
r∆M
b
(
cb=2 + r
R∗∗M
− pH) > 0
The ﬁrst term on the left is positive since R∗∗M >
r
pM
, and the second term is positive
as well if cb=2 + r > pHR
∗∗
M . But from assumption 1 αpM > R
∗∗
M so that the previous
inequality can be replaced by cb=2+r > pHαpM which holds since I have r > αpM − c
b=2,
that is to say the M-yield project (no eﬀort) cannot sustain monitoring and have a positive
net present value.
Thus the mass of ﬁrms undertaking M-projects goes in the other direction and decreases
when a productivity shock hits:
∂(emax − e¯
∗∗)
∂α
< 0
(32)
– I have that, when a productivity shock hits, ineﬃcient bank loans are less cyclical than
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eﬃcient bank loans if I have (and using the fact that I know R∗∗M >
r
pM
):
∂B∗∗M
∂α
<
∂B∗∗H
∂α
R∗∗M
(b/∆M +R∗∗M − α)
2
<
rpH
(pH(
e
∆H
− α) + cpu + r)2
So a suﬃcient condition for the above equation to be met is for ψ to be large enough if
the left hand side is decreasing in ψ, which is indeed the case, since, from assumption 3
and 4, I have:
∂2B∗∗M
∂αψ
=
(b/∆M +R
∗∗
M − α)(b/∆M −R
∗∗
M − α)
(b/∆M +R∗∗M − α)
4
< 0 (33)
Proof of Corollary 2. The heterogeneity in the ﬂuctuations of aggregate lending across market
segment or across bank type in the case of several heterogeneous banks is demonstrated as
follows:
– From Proposition 17 part 1 and Proposition 16 part 2, I know that both the mass of
entrepreneur choosing the eﬃcient bank as well as individual loans oﬀered by eﬃcient
banks increase as a result of a productivity shock. So at the aggregate, overall eﬃcient
bank lending is procyclical.
– From Proposition 17 Part 2 and Proposition 16 Part 3, I know that the mass of en-
trepreneur choosing the ineﬃcient bank is countercyclical while individual loans oﬀered
by ineﬃcient banks are less procyclical than the one oﬀered by eﬃcient banks. So at the
aggregate, overall ineﬃcient bank lending is less cyclical than eﬃcient bank lending, and
is procyclical or countercyclical depending on the relative force of the two opposite eﬀects.
Proof of Corollary 4. From proposition 17 part 1, I obtain:
∂2e¯∗∗
∂α∂φ
=
r∆Mc
l
bR∗∗M
> 0
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Proof of Corollary 5. From proposition 11, proposition 1 and corollary 4, I have:
∂2
∂α∂φ
(
α
pH ∗ (e¯
∗ − emin) + pM ∗ (e
max − e¯∗)
emax − emin
)
=
pH − pM
emax − emin

∂e¯
∗∗
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
-
+α
∂2e¯∗∗
∂α∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+


Proof of Proposition 18. The several points of the proposition are demonstrated as follows:
– When a productivity shock hits, the interest rate oﬀered to eﬀort-making entrepreneurs
is more volatile the presence of bank heterogeneity than in the social optimum case since
I have:
∣∣∣∣∂R∗∗H∂α
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∂RoH∂α
∣∣∣∣
r
cb=2∆2H
(pH(α∆H − e)− cb=2∆H)2
> r
cl
(pH(α−
e
∆H
− c
l
pH
))2
(1 + φb=2)
(pHα− e
pH
∆H
− cl(1 + φb=2))2
>
1
(pHα− e
pH
∆H
− cl)2
– When a productivity shock hits, the pool of eﬀort-making entrepreneurs is less volatile in
the presence of bank heterogeneity than in the social optimum case if I have:
∂eo
∂α
>
∂e¯∗∗
∂α
∆H > ∆H
pH (pH −
r∆M
b
− r
R∗∗
M
+
r∆Mα
R∗∗
M
b
)− (αpH − c
b=2 − r)
r∆M
R∗∗
M
b
(pH −
r∆M
b
− r
R∗∗
M
+
r∆Mα
R∗∗b
)2
(pH −
r∆M
b
−
r
R∗∗
M
+
r∆Mα
R∗∗
M
b
)
2
> pH (pH −
r∆M
b
−
r
R∗∗
M
) + (c
b=2
+ r)
r∆M
R∗∗
M
b
(34)
Now in the extreme case where ψ becomes large, then I can ignore the terms with R∗∗M at
the denominator, so that I get, with pH −
r∆M
b < 0:
(pH −
r∆M
b
)2 > pH(pH −
r∆M
b
)
pH −
r∆M
b
< pH
−
r∆M
b
< 0
which indeed holds. Now if ψ becomes small, the left hand side of (34) increases from
assumption 4 and the right hand side decreases. So equation (34) always holds, provided
that b < r∆MpH ; that is to say, if the eﬃcient beneﬁt of not behaving is small enough, else
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if the eﬃcient beneﬁt is too high the ineﬃcient bank on the M-segment of the market will
have to oﬀer relatively less attractive loans when a negative shock hits, because otherwise
the entrepreneur would be better oﬀ diverting funds from a large loan when the return on
behaving is low. Then as a result, with high private beneﬁts, relatively less entrepreneurs
would be attracted by M-contracts whose conditions are deteriorating faster, which would
mean a larger volatility of the pool of eﬀort-making entrepreneurs.
58
B Simulations
Table 1: Parametrisation
pH pM pL α b c
l φ r A ψ
0.9 0.6 0.4 2.24 0.24 0.2 0.5 1 1 0.1
Figure 9: Simulation of Loan size for each entrepreneur versus optimal benchmark
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Note : for the value of α displayed in table 1. The vertical black line (resp. dashed-line) corresponds to the cut-
off below which entrepreneurs self-select effort inducing contracts implementing H-projects for the heterogeneous
banking equilibrium (resp. for the optimal benchmark).
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Figure 10: Simulation of Loan size for each entrepreneur versus market equilibrium bench-
mark
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Note : for the value of α displayed in table 1. The vertical black line (resp. dashed-line) corresponds to the cut-
off below which entrepreneurs self-select effort inducing contracts implementing H-projects for the heterogeneous
banking equilibrium (resp. for the market equilibrium without banking heterogeneity).
Figure 11: Simulation of the State Space
Note : the red area corresponds to the efficient bank loans to effort making entrepreneurs when a inefficient bank
is active; the blue and cyan area correspond to the inefficient bank loans to non-effort making entrepreneurs. The
cyan area corresponds to the range of entrepreneurs which would have chosen to undertake effort at the optimum
while the black line gives the cut-off entrepreneurs separating the effort and non-effort making segment of the
market for the market equilibrium in the absence of heterogeneity in banking efficiency.
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Figure 12: Loan size as a function of productivity : H-yield market segment
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Note : loan size on the H-segment of the market is evaluated for an entrepreneur with effort cost equal to 0.3
while the cut-off effort level is 0.36.
Figure 13: Loan size as a function of productivity : M-yield market segment
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Figure 14: Average realised productivity of entrepreneurs as a function of the common
productivity parameter
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Figure 15: Weighted average realised productivity of the economy as a function of the
common productivity parameter
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Figure 16: Aggregate lending to the economy as a function of the common productivity
parameter
2 2.05 2.1 2.15 2.2 2.25 2.3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
productivity
e
co
n
o
m
y−
wi
de
 le
nd
in
g
 
 
No Banking Heterogeneity (psi=0, phi=0)
With Banking Heterogeneity (psi=0, phi=0.5)
With Banking Heterogeneity and markup (psi=0.8, phi=0.5)
Optimum
Figure 17: Aggregate output as a function of the common productivity parameter
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